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Giuseppe Bonifacio v NSW Trustee and Guardian acting as executor of the Estate of the late Adam Frank Woitala [2015] NSWSC 124 (27 February 2015)
Last Updated: 2 March 2015
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Supreme Court
New South Wales
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Case Name:
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Giuseppe Bonifacio v NSW Trustee and Guardian acting as executor of the
Estate of the late Adam Frank Woitala
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Medium Neutral Citation:
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Hearing Date(s):
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5 February 2015
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Date of Orders:
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27 February 2015
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Decision Date:
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27 February 2015
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Jurisdiction:
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Equity Division
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Before:
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Darke J
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Decision:
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Catchwords:
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – land held in co-ownership – co-owner
fraudulently procures transfer to himself of co-owner’s
interest –
transfer registered in 1995 – by 1998 defrauded party aware of fraud
– proceedings not commenced until
2013 – cause of action for
recovery of land – whether cause of action does not accrue until fraudster
is in adverse possession
– whether fraudster in adverse possession –
Limitation Act 1969 ss 27, 38, 47
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Legislation Cited:
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Cases Cited:
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Texts Cited:
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Peter Butt, Land Law, (6th ed 2010, Thomson Reuters
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Category:
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Principal judgment
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Parties:
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Giuseppe Bonifacio (first plaintiff) Eva Bonifacio (second
plaintiff)
NSW Trustee and Guardian acting as executor of the Estate of
the late Adam Frank Woitala (first defendant) Registrar-General of NSW
(second defendant)
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Representation:
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Counsel: Mr R Lovas (plaintiffs) Mr J E Thomson (first
defendant)
Solicitors: Fordham Lawyers (plaintiffs) Ms P A Keith
(first defendant) Land and Property Information, Legal Services (second
defendant)
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File Number(s):
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2013/377112
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Publication Restriction:
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Nil.
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JUDGMENT
Introduction
- By
their Amended Statement of Claim the plaintiffs, Mr Giuseppe Bonifacio and Mrs
Eva Bonifacio, seek a declaration that the first
defendant, New South Wales
Trustee and Guardian as executor of the Estate of the late Mr Adam Woitala,
holds a one half interest
in a property in Greene Avenue, Ryde on a constructive
trust for them. It is alleged that the constructive trust arose in 1995 when
Mr
Woitala fraudulently registered a transfer to himself of the plaintiffs'
interest in the property. The plaintiffs also seek an
order that the second
defendant, the Registrar-General, amend the Real Property Act Register to
restore the plaintiffs' interest in the property upon the title. The
Registrar-General has filed a submitting appearance,
submitting to any order
save as to costs.
- The
first defendant, for whom Mr J E Thomson of Counsel appeared, ultimately did not
seek to challenge the contention that the 1995
transfer was fraudulently
procured by Mr Woitala. However, the first defendant opposed the relief sought,
primarily on the ground
that the plaintiffs' causes of action are statute
barred. In that regard, it was common ground that the plaintiffs had become
aware
of the fraud by no later than 13 February 1998. The proceedings were not
commenced until 16 December 2013, more than 15 years later,
and after Adam
Woitala's death.
Salient facts
- Mr
Zygmunt Woitala and his wife Anna Woitala came to Australia in about 1949, with
their daughter Eva, the second plaintiff. The family
settled in Newcastle. Mr
and Mrs Woitala had two more children, Sigmund and then Adam.
- Eva
Woitala married Giuseppe Bonifacio in 1968. By 1975, the couple were living in a
rented two bedroom flat in Lakemba with their
young son Anthony. Adam Woitala
was still living in Newcastle. At about that time, as a consequence of some
trouble Adam Woitala
found himself in with the police, Mr and Mrs Woitala
arranged for him to leave Newcastle and live with the Bonifacios in Lakemba.
According to Mr Bonifacio, Mrs Woitala begged Mrs Bonfacio to take Adam under
her control.
- The
Bonifacios agreed to take Adam in. However, the small flat in Lakemba proved
unsuitable for four people. Mr and Mrs Woitala then
decided to buy a house in
which Adam and his sister's family could live together. They chose the property
in Greene Avenue, Ryde.
- The
property was purchased in early 1975 for $36,000. The contract for sale was not
in evidence. Nonetheless, it appears that a deposit
of about $13,000 was paid by
Mrs Woitala and the balance of the purchase price was contributed by Mr and Mrs
Bonifacio and Adam Woitala
who together borrowed $24,000 from the Commonwealth
Savings Bank. Upon settlement of the purchase, the property was transferred to
Mr and Mrs Bonifacio as joint tenants as to one half and Adam Woitala as to the
other half. The respective one half interests were
held as tenants in common.
There was a registered mortgage in favour of the Commonwealth Savings Bank.
- The
Bonifacio family and Adam Woitala commenced living together at the property. At
some stage, an arrangement was put in place, seemingly
at the instigation of Mrs
Bonifacio, whereby the Bonifacio family would pay three quarters of the
outgoings of the property (such
as rates and utility bills) with Adam Woitala to
pay the remaining one quarter. The arrangement may have extended to the mortgage
repayments, but the evidence is not clear about that.
- For
a time, Adam Woitala was unemployed and not able to pay his share of the
expenses. Mr Bonifacio helped him to find a job as a
waiter. After that, Adam
Woitala did pay his share of expenses, but according to Mrs Bonifacio he did not
pull his weight in relation
to household chores and maintenance, and this led to
tension. Eventually, Mr and Mrs Bonifacio decided they could no longer live
with
Adam Woitala, and the Bonifacios moved to South Australia. This occurred in
1979.
- Later
that year the Bonifacios borrowed money to purchase a block of land in South
Australia, and they subsequently built a home on
the land. After the Bonifacios
moved to South Australia, they made little or no financial contribution towards
the expenses of the
property. The evidence is scant, but as far as it goes it
suggests that, at least for a time, Mrs Woitala provided the funds for
most, if
not all, of those expenses.
- Mrs
Bonifacio says that Adam Woitala lost his job due to dishonesty, spent some time
in gaol, and later could not find employment.
She deposed that their mother gave
him money to pay the mortgage and other bills. She also deposed that their
mother later told her
that she had advanced Adam money to pay the rest of the
mortgage off. However, in cross-examination, Mrs Bonifacio maintained, and
I
accept, that her mother did not say that she had advanced money to Adam, or that
she had paid the mortgage off for Adam or on his
behalf; rather, she had merely
said that she had paid off the mortgage, or had given Adam the money to pay off
the mortgage.
- In
any event, the mortgage was discharged in April 1980. The certificate of title
remained in the custody of the Commonwealth Bank.
Adam Woitala continued to
reside at the property. According to Mrs Bonifacio, when she and her family
visited the property in the
mid-1980s, it was apparent that her brother had not
been adequately cleaning and maintaining the property.
- In
about the late 1980s, Mrs Bonifacio was informed by a representative of the
Commonwealth Bank that her brother wanted to obtain
custody of the title deed to
the property. Mrs Bonifacio says that she told the representative that she could
not trust her brother
and that the deed should remain with the bank. Mrs
Bonifacio further says that her mother had earlier told her that it was best to
leave the deed with the bank.
- In
the years that followed the Bonifacios' move to South Australia, Mrs Bonifacio
and Adam Woitala maintained occasional contact through
telephone calls or
letters. Mrs Bonifacio agreed that her brother "might have mentioned a few
times" that he wanted the property
to be transferred into his name alone. She
says that her parents had told her not to do that. Mrs Bonifacio did not accept
that there
was quite a lengthy history of disagreement between her brother and
herself concerning the title or that the matter was a bone of
contention between
them. In any case, Adam Woitala's suggestion was evidently not met with
approval.
- On
about 13 January 1994, Mrs Bonifacio received a letter from her brother which
was in the following terms:
"Dear Eva,
This is to inform you and your dog husband that I will be transferring deed
transfer to myself and paying the $3000.00 costs of stamp
duty etc myself, when
I can.
All the best. No hard feelings.
Adam"
- There
is no evidence of what response, if any, was made to that letter.
- Mrs
Bonifacio received a further letter on about 7 May 1994. This letter was in the
following terms:
"Dear Eva and Joey,
As soon as I get the money together I will transfer your names out of my
life. Off the deed to here. This is just to let you know
so you don't worry that
things are bad for me and not your fault.
All the best,
Adam"
- Again,
there is no evidence of what response, if any, was made.
- Mrs
Woitala died in May 1995. In about June 1995, a form of transfer was prepared
whereby the interest of the Bonifacios in the property
was to be transferred to
Adam Woitala. The transfer form includes signatures purporting to be those of Mr
and Mrs Bonifacios as transferees.
They claim, and the first defendant accepts,
that the signatures were not genuine. The first defendant further accepts that
Adam
Woitala used the transfer form to fraudulently procure the transfer in his
favour.
- The
form of transfer includes a stamp that indicates that Adam Woitala had managed
to procure the certificate of title for the purpose
of the dealing. A new
certificate of title, showing Adam Woitala alone as the registered proprietor,
was issued on 24 July 1995.
This was apparently kept by Adam Woitala at the
property. It was found there by Mrs Bonifacio after his death.
- By
September 1997, Mr Woitala senior was living with the Bonifacios in South
Australia. On about 30 September 1997, Adam Woitala sent
a letter to his father
at that address. The reverse side of the envelope contained the following
handwriting:
"PS:- Dad, the deed is signed over into my name
only."
- Mrs
Bonifacio accepted that she saw the envelope, including the postscript, within a
few days of 30 September 1997. She says that
she was not sure whether her
brother had really effected a transfer into his name. It was decided to consult
a solicitor in order
to ascertain the position.
- The
Bonifacios engaged Mr John Fordham, solicitor, for that purpose. On 13 February
1998, Mr Fordham sent a letter to Adam Woitala
in the following
terms:
"I act on behalf of Mr & Mrs Giuseppe and Eva
Bonifacio.
My client's have instructed me in relation to the property at 1 Greene
Avenue, Ryde and I enclose a copy of the Transfer of that property
from their
names into your name which appears to have been prepared and lodged at the Land
Titles Office.
My instructions are that my client's signatures are not there and the
signature of the witness would also not appear to be bona fide.
You will appreciate that this is a most serious matter and I would appreciate
hearing from you at an early date as to an explanation
of the purported
transfer."
- Adam
Woitala did not respond to the letter. Mr Fordham contacted the police in
relation to the matter in June 1998.
- Mr
Woitala senior died in July 1998. When Mr and Mrs Bonifacio were in Sydney for
the funeral, they provided information to the police,
including specimen
signatures. However, it appears that Adam Woitala avoided speaking to the
investigating police. By July 1999,
the investigation had ceased.
- Mr
Fordham suggested to Mrs Bonifacio that a civil claim be pursued, although he
noted that to do so would be expensive. Mr R Lovas
of Counsel, who appeared for
the plaintiffs, conceded that such a suggestion had been made by 13 February
1998, but the evidence
on this point was unclear. I would infer, based on the
structure of the narrative contained in Mrs Bonifacio's affidavit, that it
is
likely that the suggestion was made in 1998 after the police had unsuccessfully
attempted to speak to Adam Woitala at the property.
- When
the Bonifacios returned home to South Australia following Mr Woitala's funeral,
contact between Mrs Bonifacio and Adam Woitala
became less frequent. Mrs
Bonifacio deposed, and I accept, that she asked her brother to "change the
fraud" but he refused. She also
deposed, and I also accept, that Adam Woitala
would say:
"It is my house. That is it."
- The
evidence is again unclear as to when such discussions took place. However, Mrs
Bonifacio's narrative suggests that they are likely
to have occurred not long
after the return to South Australia.
- Despite
the evidence of Adam Woitala's firmly expressed attitude, Mrs Bonifacio deposed
in a further affidavit that Adam Woitala "never
indicated to me that he was
excluding me from using or possessing the House (together with him) if I had
ever wanted to." In the
absence of any evidence of some discussion about Mrs
Bonifacio coming back to live at the property, I am not prepared to place any
weight on upon that evidence.
- However,
I do accept the evidence of Mrs Bonifacio that Adam Woitala did not change the
locks or ask her or her husband to return
their keys. Those keys were
nonetheless thrown away by the Bonifacios as part of a general house
clean-up.
- For
various reasons, the plaintiffs did not institute proceedings against Adam
Woitala. Mrs Bonifacio says that she thought that he
might change his mind. She
also hoped that, in some way, she and her husband would get the property back
after Adam Woitala died.
Mr Bonifacio had a similar hope.
- On
occasions, Mr and Mrs Bonifacio visited Adam Woitala at the property and were
invited in. One such occasion was in 2011 after Adam
Woitala was diagnosed with
cancer.
- Adam
Woitala died on 21 August 2012. He had been in Concord Hospital, suffering from
the cancer.
- On
2 August 2012, he made a will appointing the first defendant as executor, and
giving all of his estate to his friend Sonia Khatri
(provided she survived him).
It appears from an earlier will made by Adam Woitala in May 2012 that Sonia
Khatri was a nurse at the
hospital.
- After
Adam Woitala's death, Mrs Bonifacio obtained a key to the property from her
brother Sigmund. Mrs Bonifacio believes that Sigmund
obtained the key from Adam.
Mrs Bonifacio went inside the house and thereupon found the Certificate of Title
to the property. She
gave it to Mr Fordham. Mr and Mrs Bonifacio lodged a caveat
claiming an interest as joint tenant of a one half share by virtue of
the fraud
committed by Adam Woitala. Adam Woitala is still shown as the registered
proprietor of the property.
Submissions
- Mr
Lovas submitted that a case had clearly been made out that Adam Woitala had
fraudulently registered the forged transfer in 1995
and that he henceforth held
a one half interest in the property as a constructive trustee for the
plaintiffs. It was submitted that
in these circumstances the plaintiffs obtained
personal equitable rights against Adam Woitala which were not defeated by the
indefeasibility
provisions of the Real Property Act, and as such they could seek
orders to have the Register amended to recognise their title.
- So
much was essentially conceded by Mr Thomson. Mr Thomson submitted, however, that
the plaintiffs' claims were defeated by the operation
of the provisions of the
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ("the Act"), or else by laches. The submissions of the
parties were focused upon these issues.
- In
relation to the Act, Mr Thomson submitted that following the registration of the
fraudulent transfer, the plaintiffs were entitled to take action against
Adam
Woitala to recover their land (see s 118(1)(d) Real Property Act 1900 (NSW)),
and have the Register amended accordingly (see s 138 of the Real Property Act).
Such a claim is regarded as having an equitable character (see Breskvar and
Another v Wall and Others [1971] HCA 70; (1971) 126
CLR 376 at 387 per Barwick
CJ, 400 per Windeyer J and 408 per Walsh J). It was then submitted that s 27(2)
of the Act (which, by reason of s 36 of the Act, covers causes of action to
enforce equitable estates or interests in land) imposes a limitation period of
twelve years running from
the date on which the cause of action first accrues to
the plaintiff. In this case, that would be when the forged transfer was
registered
in 1995. Mr Thomson accepted that where, as here, fraud is involved,
the period before which the plaintiff first discovers (or may
with reasonable
diligence discover) the fraud, does not count in the reckoning of the limitation
period. However, as the plaintiffs
were aware of Adam Woitala's fraud by no
later than 13 February 1998, it was submitted that the twelve year limitation
period ran
from at least that date and had expired by 13 February 2010.
- Mr
Thomson further submitted that if the plaintiffs' action is characterised as one
on a cause of action to recover trust property,
the same result would follow
because s 47 of the Act would operate to impose a limitation period of twelve
years running from the date on which the plaintiff first discovers (or may
with
reasonable diligence discover) the facts giving rise to the cause of action and
that the cause of action has accrued.
- Mr
Lovas, in response, referred to s 38 of the Act. Section 38 relevantly
provides:
"(1) Where, on the date on which, under
this Act, a cause of action would, but for this section, accrue, the land is not
in adverse possession, the accrual is postponed so that the
cause of action does
not accrue until the date on which the land is first in adverse possession.
[...]
(4) For the purposes of this section:
(a) adverse possession is possession by a person in whose
favour the limitation period can run,
(b) possession of land subject to a rentcharge by a person
who does not pay the rent is possession by the person of the rentcharge,
and
(c) in a case to which section 33 applies, receipt of the
rent by a person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land subject to the
lease is, as against the landlord,
adverse possession of the land.
(5) Where land is held by joint tenants or tenants in
common, possession by a tenant of more than his or her share, not for the
benefit of the other tenant, is, as against the other tenant, adverse
possession."
- Mr
Lovas submitted that the accrual of the cause of action to recover land was
postponed until the land was first in adverse possession;
that is, possession
which is open, not secret; peaceful, not by force; and adverse, not by consent
of the true owner (as described
by Bowen CJ in Eq. sitting in the Court of
Appeal in Mulcahy v Curramore Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 464 at 475). Mr Lovas
submitted that this was not shown to have occurred while Adam Woitala was alive.
He accepted that Adam Woitala's
possession following the fraud was open and
peaceful. However, it was contended that the possession was not adverse because
it was
consented to by the plaintiffs.
- Mr
Lovas also submitted that Adam Woitala's possession could be regarded as being
for the benefit of the plaintiffs, and thus not
adverse possession within nsw/consol_act/la1969133/s38 .html" class="autolink_findacts">s
38(5) of the Act, primarily because it relieved them of having to pay outgoings
in respect of the property. It was suggested that, in effect, the
plaintiffs
thereby "received an occupation fee in kind".
- Mr
Lovas further submitted that the plaintiffs' action could be characterised as
one for breach of trust, and there was no breach
of the trust while Adam Woitala
was alive. It was suggested that there was no breach until the claimed
constructive trust was denied
by the first defendant.
- Mr
Thomson countered that s 38 of the Act did not apply in this case
because:
- (1) the section
only applies to a cause of action for recovery of land that depends upon proof
of adverse possession, and that was
not the case here; or
- (2) the section
only applies to causes of action that accrue under the "accrual sections" of the
Act, those being ss 28 to 35.
- Mr
Thomson further submitted that even if s 38 applied, Adam Woitala's possession
was adverse to the plaintiffs, and fell within s 38(5) of the Act.
- Finally,
Mr Thomson submitted in the alternative that the plaintiffs' claim to relief
should be denied due to laches. It was put that
the delay in the commencement of
proceedings until after Adam Woitala's death meant that his evidence about the
circumstances in
which he claimed the right to become the sole owner of the
property was not available. It was put that the first defendant was prejudiced
by not being able to properly investigate the arrangements within the family
concerning the ownership of the property. Mr Lovas,
referring to Orr v Ford
[1989] HCA 4; (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 330-331, submitted that in all the
circumstances the suggested loss of evidence concerning a family arrangement was
"entirely
suppositional" and thus no forensic prejudice was
established.
Determination
- In
my opinion, the plaintiffs' action may be characterised as either an action on a
cause of action to recover land within the meaning
of s 27(1) of the Act, or an
action on a cause of action to recover trust property within the meaning of s
47(1)(c) of the Act. I do not think that the action ought be regarded as an
action in respect of a breach of trust. The plaintiffs' Amended Statement
of
Claim contains no allegation of a breach of trust. Rather, it is contended that
the fraudulent conduct of Adam Woitala in 1995
has the consequence that a one
half interest in the property became held by him (and is now held by the first
defendant) as a constructive
trustee for the plaintiffs.
- The
plaintiffs' cause of action to recover land is one that is based on fraud.
Accordingly, the relevant limitation period fixed by
or under the Act for the
cause of action does not commence to run until the plaintiff first discovers, or
may with reasonable diligence discover,
the fraud (see s 55(1) of the Act). In
this case, the plaintiffs had discovered the fraud by no later than 13 February
1998. It follows that if any limitation period
would have otherwise commenced to
run in respect of the cause of action, the commencement is postponed to no later
than 13 February
1998.
- Section
27(2) of the Act, which applies generally to causes of action to recover land
other than when brought by the Crown, provides for the limitation period
in
respect of the cause of action to commence from the date on which the cause of
action first accrues to the plaintiffs. Subsequent
sections (ss 28 to 35 of the
Act) provide that, in particular circumstances, a cause of action to recover
land accrues on a certain date. These provisions, which
in my view are not
exhaustive (cf. Paradise Beach Transportation Co Ltd v Price-Robinson [1968] AC
1072 at 1085D), do not seem to have application to the cause of action in this
case. Mr Lovas did not suggest that any of those sections
applied. The cause of
action is based upon Adam Woitala's conduct in procuring registration of the
fraudulent transfer in 1995. It
seems to me that the cause of action to recover
the land lost as a result of the fraud must be taken to have first accrued to
the
plaintiffs when registration of the transfer took place. Leaving aside the
possible operation of s 38 of the Act, the twelve year limitation period set by
s 27(2) of the Act, as affected by s 55(1), would have commenced running by 13
February 1998 and would have expired before the commencement of these
proceedings.
- However,
if s 38 of the Act applies, there would be a postponement of the accrual of the
cause of action until the date on which the land is first in adverse
possession.
For the purposes of s 38 , which is based upon s 10(1) of the Limitation Act 1938
(UK) (see Report of the Law Reform Commission on Limitation of Actions, October
1967, Appendix C at paragraph 188), adverse possession is "possession by a
person in whose favour the limitation period can run"
(see s 38(4)(a) of the
Act).
- In
J A Pye (Oxford) Limited v Graham [2002] UKHL 30; [2003] 1 AC 419, Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted
that although upon the passing of the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 (3 &
4 Will 4, c 27) the
traditional notion of adverse possession was done away with,
the phrase "adverse possession" was reintroduced by the Limitation Act
1939
(UK). His Lordship stated (at [35]-[36]):
"From 1833 onwards,
therefore, old notions of adverse possession, disseisin or ouster from
possession should not have formed part
of judicial decisions. From 1833 onwards
the only question was whether the squatter had been in possession in the
ordinary sense
of the word. That is still the law, as Slade J rightly said.
After 1833 the phrase "adverse possession" did not appear in the statutes
until,
to my mind unfortunately, it was reintroduced by the Limitation Act 1939,
section 10 of which is in virtually the same words
as paragraph 8(1) of Schedule
1 to the 1980 Act. In my judgment the references to "adverse possession" in the
1939 and 1980 Acts
did not reintroduce by a side wind after over 100 years the
old notions of adverse possession in force before 1833. Paragraph 8(1)
of
Schedule 1 to the 1980 Act defines what is meant by adverse possession in that
paragraph as being the case where land is in the
possession of a person in whose
favour time "can run". It is directed not to the nature of the possession but to
the capacity of
the squatter. [...]
[...] In my judgment much confusion and complication would be avoided if
reference to adverse possession were to be avoided so far
as possible and effect
given to the clear words of the Acts. The question is simply whether the
defendant squatter has dispossessed
the paper owner by going into ordinary
possession of the land for the requisite period without the consent of the
owner. [...]"
(see also Lord Hope of Craighead at [69]-[71]).
- Lord
Browne-Wilkinson continued (at [40]):
"In Powell's case 38 P &
CR 470 Slade J said, at p 470:
"(1) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with the
paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land
as being the person with
the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance,
ascribe possession either to
the paper owner or to persons who can establish a
title as claiming through the paper owner. (2) If the law is to attribute
possession
of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession,
he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite
intention to
possess ('animus possidendi')."
Counsel for both parties criticised this definition as being unhelpful since
it used the word being defined- possession- in the definition
itself. This is
true: but Slade J was only adopting a definition used by Roman law and by all
judges and writers in the past. To
be pedantic the problem could be avoided by
saying there are two elements necessary for legal possession: (1) a sufficient
degree
of physical custody and control ("factual possession"); (2) an intention
to exercise such custody and control on one's own behalf
and for one's own
benefit ("intention to possess"). What is crucial is to understand that, without
the requisite intention, in law
there can be no possession. [...]"
- Similarly
in New South Wales, the concept of adverse possession has been treated, in the
context of the extinguishment of title, as
requiring both actual possession and
an intention to possess (see, for example, Weber v Ankin [2008] NSWSC 106 at
[103] per White J; Bridges v Bridges [2010] NSWSC 1287 at [14]- [16] per
Tamberlin AJ; Peter Butt, Land Law, (6th ed 2010, Thomson Reuters) at [22
13]-[22 18].) Further, as noted earlier, the possession
must be open, peaceful
and not by the consent of the true owner (see Mulcahy v Curramore Pty Ltd
(supra); Webeck v Foley [1992] NSW
Conv R 59, 717; (1992) 5 BPR 11, 694).
- I
have some doubt that s 38 is applicable in the present case. It operates only in
respect of "the date on which, under this Act,
a cause of action would, but for
this section, accrue". Read literally, it operates only in circumstances where
the date of accrual
is provided for or determined under the Act itself, as is
the case with causes of action falling within ss 28 to 35 (cf. Chan v Cresdon
[1989] HCA 63; (1989) 168 CLR 242 at 249). I am inclined to think that where the
date of accrual is not provided for or determined under the Act itself, but is
determined
outside the Act, s 38 does not apply.
- Certainly,
where the cause of action is one brought by a person deprived of land by a
fraud, as envisaged by s 118(1)(d) of the Real Property Act, there is little
reason to conclude that factual possession of the land by the wrongdoer should
be required before the cause of action
is taken to accrue and time commences to
run for limitation purposes. In such cases, the person wrongfully deprived of
land obtains
the benefit of the provisions of the Act that operate to prevent
the running of time until the deprived party discovers, or ought
reasonably
discover, the relevant facts (see s 55(1) of the Act). Once the deprived party
is in possession of the relevant facts,
there is no good reason why time should
not commence to run for limitation purposes, regardless of whether the fraudster
is actually
in possession of the land. The victim would be entitled to take
proceedings against the fraudster, even if the fraudster was not
actually in
possession of the land.
- Nevertheless,
it is not necessary to express a concluded view concerning the applicability of
s 38. Even if the section applies, it
is my opinion that Adam Woitala was from
at least the end of 1998 in adverse possession of the whole of the
property.
- By
1994, Adam Woitala had been living alone at the unencumbered property for many
years. He began agitating for the plaintiffs to
transfer their interest in the
property to him. In the face of either resistance, or a lack of agreement, to
that course, Adam Woitala
openly informed the plaintiffs that he intended to
somehow effect such a transfer himself. In his letter of 7 May 1994, he stated
plainly that he intended to "transfer your names out of my life". In July 1995
Adam Woitala made good on his threat, and became recorded
on the Register as the
sole registered proprietor. By October 1997, he had effectively made the
plaintiffs aware of what he had done.
- In
1998, Adam Woitala did not reply to Mr Fordham's letter concerning the matter,
and avoided speaking to the police. He also refused
Mrs Bonifacio's request that
he "change the fraud", and emphatically stated that the house was his.
- In
summary, Adam Woitala took action to become the sole registered proprietor of
the property. He thereby assumed the status of the
person apparently entitled to
possession. When challenged in 1998 about what he had done, he maintained his
position and positively
asserted to Mrs Bonifacio that he owned the house. He
thereafter remained in possession. His later actions in inviting Mr and Mrs
Bonifacio inside the house when they visited are in no way inconsistent with his
assertion of ownership. Neither do I think that
his failure to change the locks
or request the return of keys leads to the conclusion that his possession should
not be viewed as
adverse.
- I
am unable to accept the submission that Adam Woitala's possession was not
adverse because it was consented to by the plaintiffs.
Mrs Bonifacio deposed
that she had never told her brother that he had her permission to live in the
house. The plaintiffs, by taking
the matter up with Adam Woitala, and involving
the police, showed that they did not give their consent to what had occurred. It
is
true that after 1998 the plaintiffs took no further action in opposition to
the stance taken by Adam Woitala. However, this cannot
in my view be equated to
the giving of consent such as would render his possession other than
adverse.
- Neither
do I accept the submission that Adam Woitala's possession of the property was in
some way for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
In particular, I do not think it can
be said that the plaintiffs benefited because they were relieved of obligations
in relation
to outgoings, and thus "received an occupation fee in kind". There
was no arrangement between Mr and Mrs Bonifacio and Adam Woitala
in relation to
Adam Woitala's occupation. In circumstances where Adam Woitala was asserting
that he alone was the owner of the property,
his possession after he became the
registered proprietor cannot sensibly be regarded as for the benefit of the
Bonifacios (see Paradise
Beach Transportation Co Ltd v Price-Robinson (supra) at
1085A-B).
- For
these reasons, even if s 38 applied in this case, it would not operate to
postpone the accrual of the cause of action to recover
land to any date after
the end of 1998.
- In
circumstances where the cause of action to recover land had accrued by the end
of 1998, and the plaintiffs had by then discovered
the fraud, the twelve year
limitation period provided for by s 27(2) of the Act had commenced running by
the end of 1998 and would
have expired by the end of 2010. An action on the
cause of action is thus not maintainable in these proceedings, which were not
brought
until December 2013.
- The
plaintiffs are in no better position in relation to the cause of action to
recover trust property. By s 47(1) of the Act, an action
on such a cause of
action is not maintainable if brought after the later to expire
of:
- (1) a
limitation period of twelve years running from the date on which the plaintiff
first discovers or may with reasonable diligence
discover the facts giving rise
to the cause of action and that the cause of action has accrued; and
- (2) the
limitation period for the cause of action fixed by or under any other provision
of the Act.
- In
this case, the plaintiffs discovered the facts giving rise to the cause of
action by no later than 13 February 1998, and Mrs Bonifacio
was told in 1998 by
the solicitor retained by her and her husband that a civil claim against Adam
Woitala could be pursued. In my
view, unless there was a later expiring
limitation period for the cause of action fixed by or under the Act (and there
does not appear
to be one), a limitation period of twelve years would have
commenced running by the end of 1998 and expired by the end of 2010. Again,
an
action on the cause of action is not maintainable in these proceedings.
- I
therefore conclude that the plaintiffs' claims for relief must be refused. It is
not necessary, in these circumstances, to consider
the laches
defence.
The Amended Statement of Claim should be dismissed. Orders
should also be made for the removal of the plaintiffs' caveat, and delivery
of
the Certificate of Title to the first defendant. Costs should follow the event.
I direct that, within fourteen days, the parties
bring in Short Minutes to give
effect to these reasons.
**********
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